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Abstract: This study estimates for the first time translog cost
functions for 147 American doctorate granting universities, accoun-
ting for three major products of these institutions: undergraduate
and graduate instruction and research. New measures cf research
output and guaiity are employed that do not merely use research
expenditures as the output proxy. Evidence is found for strong
economies of scale for the average institution, as well as economies
of scope related to the joint production of undergraduate and
graduate instruction. The public or private ownership of an insti-
tution is shown to be insignificant for most cost components con-
sidered, only institutional support costs are significantly higher
in the private sector. Part of the difference, however, can be
attributed to major fundraising costs in the private sector. The
intensity of state regulation of personnel and administrative
practices in the public sector does not appear to have a significant
impact on production efficiency.
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I Introduction
For a long time research on the economics of higher education
has recognized the possible effects of the scale of operations for
the efficiency of higher education (see Brinkman and Leslie,
1986 for an overview of different studies). The collection of
empirical evidence has been slow, however, in particular for
research universities. The complicated, multiple-product character
of these institutions makes analysis difficult. At the same time,
scholars have expressed concerns for the possible inefficiencies
introduced in the public sector by the intensity of government
regulation of the production process, adding another complicating
factor to the analysis. For an overview of the issue of campus
autonomy and state regulation, see Volkwein (1987, 1989).
Techniques to analyze multi-product firms have been available
for some time, originating from the work of Baumol et al (1982)
and have been applied to a wide range of industries, such as
telecommunications, rail roads and hospitals (for references, see
Wang and Friedlaender, 1985) and most recently by Cohn et al
(1989) to higher education.
Cohn et al (1989) for the first time have analyzed higher
education in the U.S.A. utilizing multi-product cost concepts.
They studied economies of scale and scope for a large sample of
1887 institutions of higher education, essentially covering all
four year institutions. The objective of this paper is to extend
their research in four ways and to provide an independent verifi-
cation of some of their results. First, by focusing on a subsample
of 147 doctorate granting universities we are able to draw specific
conclusions on this important group of institutions with a large
research emphasis. Second, we study the sensitivity of cost function
estimates to different output measures. In particular, we employ
explicit measures for research output, such as the number of
publications, instead of the dollar value of research grants used
by Cohn et al . This allows us to account for research produc-
tivity differences between institutions. The sensitivity of the
results to the inclusion of a (graduate) program quality measure
is also studied. Third, our use of the translog cost function
allows for some interesting comparisons with the quadratic cost
function employed by Cohn et al . Fourth, the impact of state
regulation of personnel and government practices on production
efficiency in public higher education is investigated using an
explicit measure of the degree of state regulation. This allows
us to address the issue of state regulation and productive effi-
ciency empirically, while acounting for other determinants of the
cost structure through the cost function approach.
In section II we formulate the theoretical framework for
this study, while section III describes the data employed. In
section IV the results of the estimated cost functions for research
universities are reported- and compared with other studies. Section
V adds a sensitivity analysis to explore the dependence of the
results to different output proxies, including peer ratings of
program quality. In section VI we focus on the possible effects
of state regulation for institutional efficiency. Finally, the
conclusions are summarized in section VII.
II Theoretical Framework
An adequate empirical test of different hypotheses regarding
the influences of economies of scale and scope and of government
regulation requires a theoretical basis that explains the behaviour
of a non-profit organizations such as an universities. Several
attempts to formulate a theory of the behaviour of the non-profit
university have been made. The university as a prestige-maximizing
entity has been put forward by Garvin (1980) . Other theories
model the university as a labor cooperative (James and Neuberger,
1986) . More general theories of non-profit organizations give a
heavy emphasis to some form of output maximization as the basis
of non-profit behaviour (James and Rose-Ackerman, 198 6) . Outputs
such as the quantity and quality of instruction, research and
public service, are possible candidates for output measures.
Other theories include often unobservable outputs, such as bureau-
cratic perks and prestige. Neither of these theories is supported
by robust empirical evidence.
Our approach in this study will be rather pragmatic. There
seems to be consensus on the primary objectives of a research
university organization: producing instruction and research 1 . We
assume that some form of cost minimization plays a role in deci-
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sion making at all levels. Once budgets are fixed at a particular
level in an organization, both administrators and faculty try to
maximize outputs given these restrictions, which is equivalent to
minimizing costs per unit of output. Of course, the precise relative
weights of different outputs are not made explicit. For our purpose
it is sufficient to assume that these relative weights do not
differ very much among research universities. This implies that
production costs, essentially the costs of such inputs as labour,
equipment and capital, are a well-behaved function of output
quantities and input prices. Given the competitive, national
labor market for faculty and senior administators at research
universities, it may be assumed that salaries and wages are similar
within each discipline at different institutions for those with
comparable (research) productivity. This implies that we can omit
differences in labor input prices in our estimates of cost functions
for research universities. Although the same assumption for the
prices of equipment and capital is more difficult to justify, we
have omitted those prices too, given the large share of labor
costs in total costs, and, therefore, the relatively small sen-
sitivity of those costs to non-labor prices.
A general translog cost function has been employed to model
the cost structure of our sample of research universities. This
function has been widely used to study multi-product industries
such as telecommunications, hospitals, trucking and railroads
(for references, see Wang and Friedlaender , 1985) . The translog
cost function has the advantage of a flexible specification,
allowing for both economies of scale and economies of scope. The
latter imply cost savings when producing more than one output
within the same firm or organization. Moreover, these economies
of scale and scope are not necessarily of the same magnitude
across the entire output range, allowing for a realistic description
of costs. Unlike the fixed cost quadratic function, employed by
Cohn et al (1989), the translog does not allow for a zero level
of one or more of the outputs. However, in our subsample of non-
specialized doctorate granting universities all institutions have
non-zero values for the outputs considered.
In this study three outputs will be employed: undergraduate
instruction, graduate instruction and research, to be proxied in
different ways. The cost function can be expressed as follows:
log C(ql,q2,q3) = k + Zi aj_ log(q.j_) + Z-j^j aj_j log(qi) log(q-j)
(1)
in which:
C = total costs
ql = undergraduate instruction output
q2 = graduate instruction output
q3 = research output
k = constant
ai, aij = coefficients
In addition to the independent variables included in equation
(1), different dummy-variables are used to account for the type of
control of an institution (public or private 2 ) , different degrees
of regulation winhin the public sector and the existence of a
medical school, which is an important determinant of the internal
cost structure.
In the actual estimates all variables will be scaled to 1 at
their respective means. This facilitates the interpretation of
the regression coefficients. For instance, the coefficients of
the terms log linear in output represent elasticities of each
output at its sample mean. Local (ray) economies of scale are
conveniently measured by the scale elasticity (SC) or ray economies
of scale coefficient (Jorgenson, 1986) defined as:
SC = 1 / Si [ 6 In (C) / 6 In (q^) ] (2)
The scale elasticity measures the percent expansion of the
outputs (all at the same rate, i.e. along a ray in output space),
which can be obtained by a one percent increase of costs. If the
scale elasticity is larger (smaller) than 1, the producer is
locally operating under ray economies (diseconomies) of scale.
Minimum ray average costs are obtained at a scale elasticity of 1.
To facilitate the interpretation of the cost structure es-
timated, we will calculate average costs along expansion paths in
in three dimensional output space. A useful path is that along a
ray through the origin in output space, keeping output proportions
fixed . Along this line segment ray average costs can be defined,
a widely used concept in studies of multi-product firms (see
Baumol et al, 1982). Essentially it measures the cost of a bundle
of outputs, defined as a multiple of a given output vector, relative
to the costs of this 'unit bundle 1 . It is formally defined as
follows:
RAC = C( H ql, /i q2, Mq3 ) / \i (3)
in which:
RAC = ray average costs
\l = number of units in the bundle q = (/i q^, ft q2 , \l q-$)
ql = undergraduate enrollment for the unit bundle
q2 = graduate enrollment for the unit bundle
q3 = number of publications for the unit bundle
Given a well-behaved cost function, minimum ray average costs
are usually achieved somewhere along the ray. Note, however, that
for each ray in output space, corresponding with different output
proportions in the unit bundle, such a minimum generally can be
found. The set of minima is designated the M-locus and plays an
important role in the analysis of the optimal industry structure.
Although ray average costs is a useful concept, other expansion
paths in output space are feasible, not necessarily along a ray
with fixed output proportions. In the case of research universities
for instance, the actual history of most institutions shows an
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expansion path typically not along a ray. For instance, a typical
small college provides only undergraduate education. University
status will often be obtained at a larger size, as graduate edu-
cation and research also are produced. The typical private univer-
sity then limits undergraduate enrollment to fairly small values,
while the typical public university would continue to expand
undergraduate enrollment. Finally, also in the latter case under-
graduate enrollment levels off, with the other outputs possibly
still increasing. This calls for exploration of other directions
in output space, using variable output proportions . Important
directions are those in which one of the outputs is variable
while the others remain at given values. The total costs per unit
of the variable output - including the costs of producing the
other two outputs at given levels - can be calculated along the
line segment parallel to the variable output axis. We will refer
to them as 'variable proportions average costs' (VAC) defined
as 3 :
VAC-l = C ( q if qj , qk0 ) / q ± (4)
in which:
VAC-l = variable proportions average costs per unit of output i
q^ = level of output i
qjO = level of output j
q^O = level of output k
Another useful multi-product cost concept is that of economies
of scope. Economies of scope refer to cost savings that are obtained
when producing one product together with another product, instead
of having firms specializing in each of the products. A sufficient
condition for economies of scope is (Baumol et al, 1982) :
<5C/<Sqi<5qj < for all pairs i,j (7)
For the translog cost function this condition can be easily-
calculated and reduces to the following condition at the sample
mean4 :
a ij + a i aj < ° (8)
This condition can be conveniently tested for statistical sig-
nificance with a standard Wald test.
Cost functions will estimated for total costs, for the costs
of the primary process of producing instruction and research and
for the costs of different types of supportive services, such as
academic support, student services, institutional support and
operation and maintance of plant. In this study, total costs are
defined as education and general expenditures according to the
definitions of the national HEGIS-survey (see section III) , minus
expenditures on public service and income transfers such as student
scholarships. Public service is excluded since we lack any data
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on corresponding output. Income transfers do not directly affect
production costs and are omitted for that reason.
Lack of comparable data excludes a more accurate definition
of costs. Although data are available on capital costs, we have
excluded them from the present analysis. They are calculated very
differently from institution to institution, depending on deprecia-
tion rules and other conventions regarding the treatment of capital
assets. Our cost functions therefore essentially represent variable
costs. We will define primary costs or expenditures as the sum of
expenditures on instruction and research as defined in the HEGIS-
surveys. An interesting advantage of this cost function approach
is that it does not require the sometimes very arbitrary allocation
of costs to separate functions, such as instruction and research.
Moreover, the possible joint production of instruction and research
- as allowed for by the translog cost function - would exclude
the a priori allocation of inputs to different outputs.
In the case of supportive services, direct output indicators-
such as the number of pay checks issued, the number of library
books circulated - are not available. In those cases we will simply
estimate the relationship between costs of supportive services
and the primary outputs, the two types of instruction and - if
relevant - research. The resulting statistical cost functions
cannot be interpreted as cost functions in the traditional sense,
but they reveal some information on the amount of supportive
inputs used to produce a particular bundle of primary outputs.
The definition of the primary output quantities constitutes
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an important problem. A measure of the final output of the instruc-
tion and research process, such as the added knowledge and skills
of students and the effects of research in enlarging knowledge and
improving technology, is very difficult to measure. Most cost
studies proxy outputs with simple, intermediate output indicators
such as the number of students or degrees. Most studies approximate
research output by research expenditure, which obviously defines
away differences in productivity (see Leslie and Brinkman, 1986)
.
Quality aspects are usually neglected when using simple quantity
measures.
We use three output measures in our main analysis. Teaching
or educational output is measured by full-time-equivalent under-
graduate enrollment and full-time equivalent graduate enrollment.
A sensitivity analysis is performed by replacing these proxies by
the number of earned undergraduate and graduate degrees respec-
tively. For research output we employ a quantitative output mea-
sure, the number of research publications, improving on often
employed input measures, such as research expenditures. Our standard
proxy will be Also, as a part of our sensitivity analysis we
include peer ratings of gradate program quality as an additional
output variable. This allows us to study the possible significance
of neglected quality differences in the main analysis. Details on
the employed proxies will be given in section III.
In this study, which focuses on the institutional level, we
have not disaggregated instruction or research output by field.
The relatively broad range of undergraduate and graduate programs
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offered by most universities in our sample does not warrant dis-
aggregation at this stage. To create a sample as homogeneous as
possible with respect to the internal output mix, we have restricted
our sample to non-specialized, doctorate granting institutions
conform the Carnegie classification of higher education institutions
(Carnegie, 1987)
.
Ill Data
To obtain a useful set of combined cost, output and regulation
data we matched various data files from different sources. The cost
data were essentially expenditure data, collected by the National
Center of Educational Statistics, the so-called HEGIS (Higher
Education General Information Survey) files. Enrollment and
earned degrees data were also obtained from HEGIS-files.
Research output was obtained using the data of the study of the
Council of Associated Research Councils (Jones et al, 1982). This
study is a very extensive survey of research-doctorate programs,
covering more than 200 institutions and 32 fields. This database
seems to be the most comprehensive survey of research output
available for the early eighties. We utilized the data of the
survey on the number of publications and the peer ratings of the
programs considered 5 . Finally, data on the regulation of public
universities, were obtained from the 1983 Volkwein survey of 86
public research universities (see Volkwein, 1987) . The absence of
13
recent, systematic data on state regulation practices and research
output, which are not collected nationwide on a regular basis,
forces us to use the fiscal year 1982-1983 as the basic year for
the empirical test. Given our objective of discovering structural
relations, this does not present a serious disadvantage.
The sample has been constructed by taking the Conference Board
sample, matching this with the different HEGIS files and selecting
all non-specialized, doctorate granting institutions according to
the Carnegie classification. Expenditure data pertain to the
fiscal year 1983 (ending September 30 1983) . Enrollment data are
for the fall of 1982, earned degrees are obtained for the academic
year 1982-1983. Publications are measured over the 1978-1979
period.
IV Empirical Results
In this section we present the econometric estimates of dif-
ferent translog output cost functions for our sample of 147 doc-
torate granting institutions and explore their implications.
Table 1 contains the OLS-regression results for the total costs,
the primary production costs and four components of supportive
costs as a function of the three outputs, a dummy variable for
private/public ownership and a dummy variable for the presence of
a medical school. The four components are: academic support,
student services, institutional support and operation and main-
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tenance of plant. All variables are scaled to 1 at their sample
means to facilitate the interpretation of the regression
coefficients
.
(table 1 here)
- For all cost components the coefficients of the terms linear in
the log of output are all significantly different from zero,
except in the case of academic support costs. The values of the
scale elasticities, evaluated at the sample mean, are larger than
1, indicating economies of scale at the mean output vector. Econo-
mies of scale are most pronounced for academic support and student
services, and smallest for operation and maintenance of plant.
- The coefficients of the terms quadratic in (log) output in ther
estimates for total and primary costs are significantly different
from zero for publications and graduate enrollment, but not for
undergraduate enrollment. This indicates that, although economies
of scale are present when expanding each of the outputs at the
sample mean, costs per output unit - keeping other outputs constant
- eventually will increase with continued expansion of graduate
enrollment or research output.
- The interaction term between undergraduate and graduate enrollment
in the cost function is clearly significantly different from
zero, while the interaction between graduate enrollment and publi-
cations is very close to the 5% significance level. A Wald test
shows that the vector a^a-; + a-j^ is significantly different from
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Table 1 Estimation results for six categories of costs
cost category
coefficient
total
costs
primary
costs
academic
support
student
services
institu-
tional
support
operation
maintenan
plant
constant -0.15*
(3.8)
-0.17*
(3.6)
-0.079
(1.0)
-0.26*
(2.9)
-0.20*
(2.8)
-0.11*
(2.2)
al 0.21*
(3.6)
0.19*
(2.8)
-0.068
(0.65)
0.42*
(3.2)
0.33*
(3.1)
0.29*
(3.9)
a2 0.25*
(4.3)
0.22*
(3.2)
0.39*
(3.7)
0.32*
(3.0)
0.24*
(2.3)
0.31*
(4.2)
a3 0.34*
(10.9)
0.40*
(10.9)
0.29*
(5.1)
- 0.22*
(3.8)
0.29*
(7.2)
all 0.051
(1.5)
0.067
(1.6)
-0.22*
(3.5)
0.055
(0.69)
0.047
(0.74)
0.091*
(2.0)
a22 0.24*
(3.6)
0.24*
(3.1)
-0.011
(0.096)
0.22*
(2.1)
0.29*
(2.5)
0.35*
(4.1)
a33 0.056*
(4.5)
0.060*
(4.2)
0.0007
(0.03)
- 0.063*
(2.8)
0.058*
(3.6)
al2 -0.21*
(3.0)
-0.26*
(3.3)
0.0049
(0.04)
-0.13
(0.90)
-0.089
(0.72)
-0.23*
(2.6)
al3 -0.018
(0.72)
-0.024
(0.83)
0.050
(1.11)
-
-0.0001
(0.002)
0.0013
(0.042)
a23 -0.085
(1.95)
-0.084
(1.66)
0.13
(1.66)
-
-0.21*
(2.7)
-0.17*
(3.1)
dummy
medical school 0.24*
(5.6)
0.28*
(5.7)
0.28*
(3.6)
0.16
(1.6)
0.044
(0.58)
0.094
(1.7)
dummy
private control 0.054
(0.92)
-0.002
(0.03)
-0.010
(0.94)
0.13
(0.96)
0.37*
(3.5)
0.060
(0.79)
R2 0.90 0.88 0.72 0.41 0.61 0.83
scale elasticity 1.25 1.23 1.63 1.35 1.27 1. 12
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
* = significant with p=0.05
zero at the 5% level, implying economies of scope. An interpretation
of this finding could be the major cost savings obtained by employ-
ing graduate students as teaching assistants at a relatively low
price. The interaction term between graduate enrollment and research
(significant at the 10% level) could signal the often assumed,
but seldom empirically proved, joint production of graduate teaching
and research. This would produce cost savings since faculty time
can be used jointly to instruct graduate students in research
methods and produce research output.
- The dummy variable to control for the existence of a medical
school is significant and postive for total and primary costs and
academic support, implying a more expensive cost structure for
the core of the production process when a medical school is present.
- The type of ownership, public or private, does not significantly
influence any of the cost components, with the exception of
institutional support. As can be derived from the regression
equation, institutional support is about 45% more expensive in the
private sector, given the same outputs. At this point, we note
that raising of private funds is a much more important, and there-
fore costly, activity in the private sector as in the public
sector. This supposedly explains at least part of the difference.
No systematic information is available on fundraising costs, but
.estimates for Stanford University 6 ^-ndicate that about 20-25% of
institutional support could be attributed to this type of costs,
explaining half of the difference we find.
Note that the costs of revenue raising for state appropriations
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in the public sector , i.e. the costs of collecting taxes, are not
included in our institutional support figures. Therefore differences
between institutional support costs in the broadest sense in the
private and public sector could be even smaller than suggested by
our estimate of about 20%.
To facilitate interpretation of the cost functions, we calcu-
lated ray average (total) costs, as introduced in section II.
Figure 1 displays ray average (total) costs as a function of
total FTE-enrollment. For this figure, the ray has been defined
by the output mix at the sample mean, i.e. every output combination
along the ray is a multiple of the vector (12739, 3632, 654) in
output space, i.e. all outputs are expanding at the same rate.
Costs are normalized to 1 at the output vector of the sample
mean.
(figure 1 here)
The ray average cost curve shows the typical L-shape known from
single product average cost curves: decreasing average costs at
the lower output range - therefore economies of scale - decreas-
ing much less rapid at higher output levels and eventually increas-
ing average costs or diseconomies of scale at very high outputs-
actually beyond the output range of our sample. In our case, a
minimum is obtained at very high output levels with \x = 18.6.
Average costs at the minimum would be 20% less than at the sample
17
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mean. However, given the very slow decrease of ray average costs
at higher outputs, already at \i = 3.3 ray average costs is within
10% of minimum average costs. This would imply an institution
with an output vector of (42,039, 11,986, 2,158). In our sample
there are institutions with graduate enrollment and publications
in this range, but (FTE) undergraduate enrollment is never larger
than 37,529 (compare table 1) . The output vector in our sample which
comes very close to this output is that of the University of Min-
nesota, which has the output vector (36,372, 12,325, 2,373). Appa-
rently, for the largest universities there is some room for expan-
ding undergraduate enrollment to reap additional economies of scale,
but not much. Note, however, that the position of the minimum
depends on the particular ray in output space. As we observed in
our discussion of table A.l (appendix), the output mix along the
ray, defined by the sample mean, is not very different from that
of the 'top public 1 research university. However, the 'top private'
research university' does have an output mix quite different from
the sample mean. Undergraduate and - to a lesser extent - graduate
enrollment is much smaller than that of the top public research
university while research output is comparable (see table 1) . Ray
average costs can also be calculated along the 'top private' ray
and are shown in figure 2 as a function of FTE-enrollment
.
(figure 2 here)
It is interesting to. note that minimum average costs now are
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obtained at much smaller enrollment levels - typical between
10,000 and 15,000 FTE-enrollment than along the average or 'top
public' ray. In fact, the top private universities are much closer
to their minimum average costs than the top public universities
provided each expands along the ray defined by its own output
proportions . Apparently, there are at least two output mixes
which are relatively efficient. The top public universities benefit
from the large economies of scale for undergraduate instruction.
At the same time, however, their large number of graduates can
only be instructed at relatively high costs. The top private
universities keep their undergraduate enrollment limited and
therefore do not exploit economies of scale fully. However, by
also having a small number of graduates, they avoid the relatively
high costs of instructing this type of students. In both cases,
the economies of scale for research are almost fully exploited.
The foregoing discussion indicates that it is instructive to
study different expansion paths in output space. In particular,
expanding one output, while keeping the others fixed, is an interes-
ting option. We have calculated 'variable proportions average
costs', as defined in section II, for the average institution,
the typical top private and the typical top public research univer-
sity. For the average institution considerable product-specific
economies of scale can be achieved by expanding each of the three
outputs separately. As an example, we present the variable propor-
tions average cost curve for research output in figure 3.
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(figure 3 here)
The potential cost savings vary from 20% when expanding under-
graduate or graduate enrollment to 100% when expanding research
output for the average institution. The large product-specific
economies of scale from expanding research output can be understood
if we realize the very skewed distribution of publications, men-
tioned in section III, implying a select group of big producers
and many small producers. The latter have a large potential for
cost savings through economies of scale in research. However, if
expanding research output is combined with large expansion of
graduates as well - as with fixed output proportions - the relati-
vely sharply rising costs of graduates reduce the cost savings
considerably. For the top public research university product-
specific economies of scale are limited, usually not larger than
10-20%, with expanding research output promising the largest
efficiency gains. However, for the top private research university
expanding undergraduate enrollment alone can generate large cost
savings, up to 7 0% of current average costs per undergraduate, as
illustrated in figure 4. This expansion path exploits the relatively
smaller costs of undergraduate enrollment, and avoids the relatively
expensive further expansion of graduate education and research.
(figure 4 here)
Expanding graduate enrollment or research output generates cost
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savings comparable with the top public research universities. Of
course, limiting undergraduate enrollment in the case of a top
private research university can serve other objectives, such as
prestige, outweighing the efficiency losses suggested by our
results. For instance, limiting undergraduate enrollment, combined
with a selective admission policy, may enhance perceived quality,
although value added per student doe not justify it. These prestige-
related outputs are only partially accounted for in our approach.
Finally, it is instructive to calculate the marginal cost of
each output. At the sample mean the following marginal costs are
obtained: $2,400 for a FTE-undergraduate student, $10,000 for a
FTE-graduate student (therefore $4,100 per student for all stu-
dents), and $75,000 per publication. The average revenue per
student (adding undergraduates and graduates) in our sample is
$3,700. Usually, the ratio of graduate to undergraduate tuition
is much less than 4 to 1. Together with the marginal cost estimates
this implies cross-subsidization of graduate instruction by under-
graduate instruction (as suggested earlier by James (1978)). Of
course, taxpayers and private sponsors subsidize all instruction
as well.
A comparison of our results with other studies (see Leslie
and Brinkman, 1986) reveals that others primarily focus on instruc-
tion outputs or instruction outputs plus research output, using
research expenditure as a proxy. Brinkman (1981) studied a sample
of 50 public and private universities. He approximated research
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output with research expenditure and allowed for a different
undergraduate/graduate education mix. He found small economies of
scale in instruction. Stommel (1978) found savings from economies
of scale up to 20% for instruction in land-grant institutions,
controlling for research expenditures and program mix, which
seems to be in the range we find. McGuire et al (1988) studied the
production of 'reputation' by research universities. Their results
are difficult to compare to ours as they consider reputation to
be the only output. In fact, their reputation index is derived from
the same peer ratings as our (graduate) program quality index and
shows a high correlation with the number of publications. Employing
a Cobb-Douglas production function, they find diseconomies of
scale in the production of reputation. This seems to be incon-
sistent with our results, even incorporating program quality as
in our extended analysis in section V. We do find economies of
scale with respect to quality improvement, although much smaller
than for the other outputs. Note, however, that their sample only
includes the 50 most prestigious institutions, that have exhausted
to a large extent their potential economies of scale for research.
Verry (1976) studied British universities, employing explicit
research output measures, such as the number of publications. He
did disaggregate different fields. He found no evidence for inter-
action terms between different outputs. However, graduate students
are not used as teaching or research assistents in most British
universities. He finds economies of scale for arts and social
sciences, but not in the physical and life sciences. The aggregate
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economies of scale in his study are very small, which is contrary
to our findings for U.S. research universities.
The study most closely related to ours is that of Cohn et al
(1989) . They estimate fixed-cost quadratic cost functions for two
samples of four year institutions, 1,195 public and 692 private
colleges and universities. The combined samples comprise almost all
four year institutions. Although their sample covers a much wider
range of institutions, their results can be compared to ours by
focusing on their estimates of scale economies and scope economies
for only the large institutions in their sample. Their average
FTE-enrollment in the public sector is 4,840, as compared with
19,631 in our sample. Their average FTE-enrollment in the private
sector is 1,960, as compared with 9,852 in our sample. A striking
difference with our results is the small ray economies of scale
they find in the public sector. Already at their sample mean
these are almost fully exhausted, while we find ray economies of
scale up to 50,000 FTE-enrollment. A possible explanation could
be the small number of research universities in their sample,
compared with the very large number of small institutions with
little or no graduate instruction or research. This makes an
accurate estimate of the cost function for high output levels
difficult. Another explanation could be the poor performance of
research expenditures as a research output proxy. We observed
large differences in faculty productivity which are not reflected
in the input measure7 . Cohn et al however do find economies of
scope over a large part of the output range. It is not clear from
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their results whether these should be attributed to joint production
of undergraduate and graduate education, or to joint production of
graduate education and research, or both. We find the most pronounc-
ed economies of scope between undergraduate and graduate education,
which seems at least consistent with their results.
V Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we present some alternative estimates of the
total cost function for research universities to test the sensitiviy
of our main results to the choice of output indicators.
Our first alternative adds a program quality variable to the
three output variables already included. The inclusion of addition-
al, qualitative aspects of output is a very difficult task. On
the instruction side one would like to have indications of the
real value added during the teaching process. Although information
on entrance qualifications of students is nationally available
through student tests such as SAT, ACT and different graduate
tests, comparable information on exit qualifications is lacking.
For research, judging the quality of publications or citations
across fields is a formidable task. However, the Conference Board
Study on research-doctorate programs (Jones et al, 1982) which is
our source for the number of publications also provides data on peer
ratings. They are subjective judgments of peers in every field on
program quality, expressed on a five point scale. The ratings are
expected to include broad, qualitative considerations on program
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quality and research output
.
Although the ratings are specifically obtained for graduate pro-
grams, we will assume that they represent a rough proxy of under-
graduate program quality as well, given the involvement of faculty
in both undergraduate and graduate instruction in most universities.
The ratings, averaged over all programs within each institution,
are therefore considered as a supplementary quality proxy for all
outputs in our main analysis. Statistics on the ratings are included
in table 1 (they are arbitrarily normalized following the Conference
Board Study to a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for the
original sample in the survey) . It is interesting that there is
such a high correlation between the average quality variable and
the number of publications in our sample (Pearson product-moment
correlation of 0.88). Although this strenghtens confidence in the
usefulness of our research output variable, it will introduce
some collinearity in our estimates as well.
The quality proxy has been added as a fourth output proxy in
the translog cost function. OLS-estimation results are presented
in table 2
.
(table 2 here)
The results shown in table 2 indicate that, as in our main
analysis, the coefficients for the terms linear in (log) output
smaller than 1. However, the coefficient of the quality proxy is
much larger than those of the other outputs, indicating that
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Table 2 Estimation results for total costs with undergraduate enroll^,
graduate enrolment, publications and quality ratings as output
constant al a2 a3 a4 all a22 a33 a44
-0.18* 0.30* 0.23* 0.21* 0.63 0.041 0.15* 0.025 1.21
(4.0) (4.7) (3.5) (3.6) (1.9) (1.2) (2.3) (0.87) (0.76)
al2 al3 al4 a23 a24 a34 dummy dummy R2 seal
medical private elarf
school control ciry
-0.18* 0.10* -0.87* -0.10 0.61 -0.12 0.24* 0.019 0.91 Q.l\
(2.6) (2.3) (2.8) (1.6) (1.6) (0.32) (5.5) (0.74)
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
* = significant with p=0.05
i
costs are relatively sensitive to the quality level. In fact, if
one wants to expand all outputs with the same percentage at the
sample mean, costs increase more than output expands (the scale
elasticity at the mean is less than 1) . Note, however, that the
quality variable is not additive: the average quality of a number
of institutions of equal quality is the same as that of each
separate institution. This implies that it is more useful to look
at directions in output space with a given quality level - for
instance the quality level one wants to maintain nationally.
The interaction terms again reveal economies of scope to be
obtained by supplying undergraduate and graduate education within
the same institution.
However, within a given quality level, ray average costs
curves are remarkable similar to those in the main analysis. As
an example a ray average cost curve as a function of FTE-enrollment
is presented in figure 5, keeping average quality at the sample
mean. As in our main analysis, ray economies of scale are present
up to high enrollment levels given the output mix of the sample
mean.
(figure 5 here)
As a second alternative we consider earned undergraduate and
graduate degrees respectively as alternative output measures to
enrollment. These are supposedly closer to the final outputs of
the education process. A drawback of these indicators is their
26
X)
I
NJ
I
C/3 »-30~, OC. teSC3>" SOC5<> K>R
i~.
it—i -* i—«'t—« t—1 1—i + i—iH r—i »_(j+ J—!
i
IHH +-HMHh +H.-iHH + H(-; t-r*-l •+ -
C
»T1
i I
c
tr
W
§1
o;
O!
Si
I
UjS
i
!
o
o:
ot
o.
§
o;-t-
o
o
o
o
JO
o
o
o +
1
ft
I
*
*
*
*
*
*
-.*:
K*
* »•
;•« *
•>
!+ + (-! -!—!»—( •» f—It—!)— f- -t- .—H-'Mt—I •« --')—ir—'•—( 4- t—(t—I t—! k< +;;—<(—.»_.M .•4 >-> + •*
delayed relation with cost figures in an earlier year. Costs are
incurred during the whole period of preparing for a degree. Given
the essentially impossible task of allocating costs in different
years to degrees obtained in a given year, we will simply relate
total costs in our base year 1982-1983 to the number of degrees
earned that year.
The estimated cost function with these education outputs,
keeping the research output proxy identical to that in the main
analysis, is given in table 3. Again, we limit the presentation
of the results to total costs.
(table 3 here)
It shows that the structure of the total cost function is
almost identical to that of this function in the main analysis.
The coefficients of the linear terms are comparable to those in
the main analysis and indicate sizable economies of scale at the
sample mean. Also here, the quadratic terms in graduate instruction
and research output are significant and positive, implying increas-
ing unit costs at the higher output levels. Again, the interaction
term between undergraduate and graduate degrees signals economies
of scope through the joint production of undergraduate and graduate
education.
The foregoing results illustrate the robustness of the outcomes
of the main analysis and warrant some confidence in the global
features of the estimated cost structure.
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Table 3 Estimation results for total costs with earned undergraduate
and graduate degrees and publications as outputs
constant al a2 a3 all a22 a33
-0.13* 0.19* 0.21* 0.36* 0.055 0.16* 0.042* .
(3.1) (3.1) (3.7) (11.5) (1.5) (3.2) (3.8)
al2 al3 " a23 dummy dummy R2 scale
medical private elasti-
school control city
-0.21* 0.009 -0.037 0.27* -0.013 0.88 1.32
(3.0) (0.32) (0.99) (6.1) (0.23)
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses)
* = significant with p=0.05
VI Effects of State Regulation
In the foregoing analysis we controlled for the difference
between public and private ownership of institutions. In this
section we analyze the possible consequences of varying degrees
of state regulation within the public sector. Using Volkwein's
1983 survey data we are able to differentiate between light,
moderate and heavy state regulation within the public sector. We
refer to Volkwein (1987) for details on the employed regulation
measure. It is essentially a scale based on different items
,
related to the degree of campus autonomy in personnel and financial
administrative practices. The Volkwein measure is available for
8 6 public doctorate granting universities. However, it turns out
that within a state there are virtually no differences between
the degree of regulation for different doctorate-granting institu-
tions in that state. We applied Volkwein's measure to our larger
sample of 147 universities by dividing the subsample of publicly
controlled universities into three roughly equal groups. For each
of the three groups dummy variables are included in our cost
function estimates. A private university has the value zero on
all three dummy variables. The results indicate no significant
effect of the degree of state regulation, except in the case of
institutional support costs. However, the coefficients of the
dummy variables are not significantly different from each other.
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This suggests that the type of control - public or private - is
important for institutional support costs - as observed in the
main analysis. The results are consistent with earlier studies by
Volkwein for the public sector (see Volkwein, 1987, 1989). These
studies use the same flexibility measure, but different indicators
to measure the performance of institutions. Also, different outputs
are not considered simultaneously as in the cost function approach.
Our results seem to confirm that there are no significant
efficiency gains in the primary production process to be expected
from state regulation of personnel and financial administrative
practices. Those regulation measures include ceilings on the
number of faculty positions, returning year-end surpluses, prescri-
bing salary schedules, regulating investment decisions, et cetera.
None of these seem to have any influence on the efficiency of the
production process, with the possible exception of reducing insti-
tutional support costs somewhat. In fact, given the costs involved
with implementing regulation on the part of the government-
these are not accounted for in our cost figures - overall efficiency
could be lowered.
VII Summary of Conclusions
Current techniques of analyzing multiple-product industries
are applied to private and public research universities. The
simultaneous production of instruction and research in the typical
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research university makes this type of analysis very useful.
Three outputs are considered: undergraduate instruction, graduate
instruction and research. The main analysis uses undergraduate
full-time-equivalent enrollment, graduate full-time-equivalent
enrollment and research publications. A robust and interesting
pattern of relationships between costs and outputs for research
universities is found.
The results indicate considerable economies of scale for the
"average" institution in the primary process of producing teaching
and research. There are even stronger economies of scale in the
production of supportive services, like libraries, administrative
support and student services. The least costly research university
with output proportions corresponding to the "average" institution,
turns out to be an institution with large undergraduate and graduate
enrollment as well as a fairly large research output. Undergraduate
enrollment is even somewhat larger than in any of the existing
institutions. The large, prestigious public universities by and
large resemble this profile. However, assuming the output mix of
a small, private university, with small undergraduate enrollment
and medium to large graduate enrollment and research output, the
results are not clear cut. Simultaneous expansion of all outputs
does not lead to sizable cost savings - implying that they are
close to minimum ray average costs - but increasing undergraduate
enrollment alone would generate considerable efficiency gains.
The effects of ownership and state regulation turn out to be
surprisingly small. Only for institutional support - i.e. central
30
administrative services - private sector costs seem to be higher
than in the public sector. However, probably half of the difference
can be explained by the costs of raising private funds in the
private sector.
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*) Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and State University of New York at
Albany, respectively. The research for this article was done
while the first author was a visiting scholar at Stanford University
(School of Education) and the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (Department of Economics) as a research fellow of the
American Council of Learned Societies. Comments of Henry M. Levin,
William F. Massy (Stanford University) and Rene Goudriaan (Erasmus
University) in an earlier stage are gratefully acknowledged. We
are indebted to Marie L. Richman (University of California at
Irvine) and Charles N. Dold (University of Illinois) for assist-
ance with the data collection.
1. We realize the importance of public service for many univer-
sities. There is, however, very limited nation-wide information
on outputs of this type.
2. As an alternative, subsamples of public and private institutions
respectively, have also been studied. A Chow-test revealed that
the coefficients of the model for the two subsamples were not
significantly different CP±± ( ±25 ~ !* 2 )«
3. Baumol et al (1982) use the term 'linear variety ray 1 to indicate
linear trajectories not through the origin. Note that an expan-
sion path in the plane defined by a fixed value of one of the
outputs, expanding the two other outputs at fixed proportions, is
another logical extension of ray average costs, which we will not
explore here.
4. Alternative ways of investigating economies of scope are pos-
sible, comparing total costs when producing outputs jointly with
those when producing each of the outputs separately. This would
involve extrapolation of the translog cost function to zero output
values where it is not defined. Although this can be circumvented
by employing Box-Cox transformations of the variables, we prefer
the more transparent approach of equation (8) . The expression is
essentially equal to the change in the output elasticity of costs
for output i induced by a (percentual) unit change in output j.
5. Unfortunately, for some disciplines in the humanities, notably
languages, publication data were not available. From the survey
we know, however, that in 80% of the institutions less than 20%
of total faculty is engaged in research in those disciplines. This
implies that neglecting this part of the output has only a small
effect on total output.
6. Private communication of J. P. Komodin.
7. Using the data of the survey on research-doctorate programs of
Jones et al (1982) we obtained average faculty productivity as
2.0 articles per two-year period, with a standard deviation of
1.0 and varying between 0.2 and 6.1, indicating large differences
in productivity.
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Appendix
To give some idea of the typical values of the different
variables in our sample, we present descriptive statistics in
table A.l. To facilitate the interpretation of later results we
also include some statistics on two subsets of our sample. They
are designated 'top public 1 and 'top private' respectively. The
subsample 'top public' is defined as those institutions having
large undergraduate and graduate enrollment, as well as a large
number of publications. Most prestigious, large public universities
belong to this subsample of 21 institutions. We define "small",
"average" and "large" values of the three output variables by
ranking all institutions in order of increasing values for each
of the outputs and constructing three groups of equal size. The
subsample 'top private' is defined as those institutions having
small undergraduate enrollment and a large number of publications.
Most private, prestigious research universities belong to this
small subsample of 11 institutions.
Although the output proportions of the 'top public' subsample
do not differ very much from the sample mean (the 'top public'
output vector is roughly twice the sample mean output vector)
,
the output proportions of the 'top private' subsample do differ
largely from the sample mean. In particular, they have almost the
same number of graduates as the number of undergraduates, while
the average institution and the 'top public' university have
roughly three times as many undergraduates as graduates.
(table A. 1 here)
Table A.l shows the large variation in the level of different
outputs. In particular the range of the number of publications is
very large. The distribution of publications is very skewed, with
the 22% 'top public' and 'top private' research universities
producing 55% of the total number of publications.
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Table A.l Descriptive statistics on the sample of
147 doctorate-granting institutions
mean minimum maximum
48697
37529
12325
FTE-enrollment
- 'top public'
-
' top private
'
FTE-undergraduates
- 'top public'
- 'top private'
FTE-graduates
- 'top public'
- 'top private 1
number of
publications
- 'top public'
- 'top private'
average program quality
undergraduate degrees
graduate degrees
16372
32453
8973
12739
25331
4679
3632
7122
4294
654
1654
1659
46
2537
1332
1605
588
414
8
28
83
101
3395
69
8288
4951
total expenditures a)
(mln dollars)
of which:
instruction and research
academic support
student services
institutional support
operation and
maintenance of plant
147
97
15
6.3
14
16
19
8.5
1.0
0.2
1.9
2.3
51
330
84
25
48
57
percentage institutions
with a medical school
percentage with
private control
48
33
a) minus income transfers and expenditures on public service
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